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A. Introduction 
 
In 2013 the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) began negotiations on the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the largest trade and/or investment 
agreement ever attempted. While lowering or removing tariffs (import taxes) is important 
because consumer goods such as shoes, automobiles, and food still carry high tariffs, various 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) constitute greater, and more costly, obstacles for business, and by 
extension, consumers.1 NTBs include regulations and rules which directly or indirectly restrict 
foreign competition by either banning a foreign presence (denying market access) or making it 
very expensive to compete with nationals. Examples include local product or ownership 
requirements, limits on business expansion or movement of employees, or limitations on when 
and how companies can bid for contracts; overlapping or duplicate product testing, inspection, 
and/or certification requirements in Europe and the US, or restrictions on certain materials and 
chemicals. All, to varying degree, hamper cross border trade and investments.  
TTIP is aimed at removing barriers, promoting regulatory coherence and setting international 
standards through various degrees of transatlantic convergence, where “Mutual recognition of 
equivalent norms and regulatory coherence across the transatlantic space….not only promise to 
improve the lives of [Americans and Europeans], but form the core of broader international 
norms and standards”.2 If all tariffs were removed, along with half of all NTBs, the boost to both 
parties would be .6-.8% of GDP annually; the economic benefits for the rest of the world from a 
TTIP are estimated by the EU Commission at €100bn.3 There are numerous studies assessing 
the different economic benefits from various levels of reduced or eliminated tariffs and NTBs, as 
well as work explaining why TTIP was launched and its initial challenges.4 However, a central 
reason for TTIP is that given the size of the transatlantic relationship (€700bn in annual bilateral 
trade, 44% of global GDP, 32% of trade, and 60% of foreign investments worldwide in 2012), 
and the importance of respective markets for third parties, agreed standards will become 
                                                          
1
 This research also includes insight gained from several personal discussions with EU and US 
negotiators, stakeholders, and public officials. 
2
 Hamilton/ Schwartz, A Transatlantic Free Trade Area - A Boost to Economic Growth?, 2012, p. 4. 
3
 EU Commissioner for Trade Karl de Gucht, 21 May, 2013; Erixon/Bauer, A Transatlantic Agreement: 
Estimating the Gains from Transatlantic Free Trade in Goods, ECIPE, 4/2010. 
4
 Francois, Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment An Economic Assessment, 
TRADE10/A2/A16 March 2013,p. 54; Felbermayr/Heid/Lehwald, Transatlantic Trade and  Investment 
Partnership (TTIP): Who benefits from a free trade deal?, Bertelsmann Foundation, June  2013: 19;  
Eliasson, Problems, progress, and prognosis in trade and investment negotiations: the Transatlantic Free 
Trade and Investment Partnership, JTS 2014. 
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globally dominant, setting the rules by which others will have to play in order to enter the 
American and European markets. 
Economic benefits notwithstanding, policy makers and legislators assess trade and investment 
agreements by a different metric. Ideology, possible political bargains, and perceptions among 
core constituents are crucial, so to better understand what is proposed, as well as the obstacles 
to an agreement, one must assess institutions, ideas, and cultural influences on TTIP. In this 
context some EU laws serve to safeguard European preferences; other laws may be modified 
as a result of TTIP. The two partners have a declared desire to increase transparency in 
regulatory processes and remove barriers to investments, yet how to achieve this remains 
unclear, and both have certain issues where progress is essential or an agreement is in 
jeopardy. For the EU these include greater access to the American public procurement market, 
retained bans on imports of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) crops and hormone treated 
beef, and recognition of geographic trademarks on food products. For the US they include 
greater access for American dairy and other agricultural products (including scientific studies as 
the only accepted criteria for SPS policies), tariff-free motor vehicle exports, and retained bans 
on foreign contractors in several areas, such as domestic shipping. 
This paper begins with a discussion of regulations and rules, and their centrality to TTIP. We 
thereafter turn to an assessment of progress in three select and controversial sectors, namely 
agricultural products and food, investments, and data protection. In addition to assessing 
current progress insight on possible and probable developments is gleaned from examining 
recent agreements with other developed countries. Europeans and Americans tend to seek 
FTAs with the same countries and regions, and they have signed three FTAs with other 
developed, democratic countries (South Korea-EU, KOREU; South Korea-US, KORUS; 
Canada-EU, CETA) within the past five years. KORUS and KOREU were finalized in 2010 and 
2011 respectively, whereas the deal between Canada and the EU was announced in October 
2013. As of July 2014 there were several unresolved issues in CETA, so comparisons with this 
paper rely on summaries released by the parties, leaked documents, public commentaries, and 
a few personal discussions with officials. Though smaller, these bi-lateral FTAs included tariff 
elimination on most products (but also retained tariffs and quotas on sensitive products), 
regulatory cooperation and mutual recognition in several areas, and committees to oversee 
compliance (including labor standards), and thus should provide some indication of respective 
side’s outer parameters of acceptable compromises, albeit with the understanding that due to 
the size and attractiveness of their internal markets Americans and Europeans largely had their 
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own standards accepted in previous bilateral agreements, whereas an agreement between 
equals, in TTIP, requires far more extensive and difficult compromises. 
 
B. Regulations 
 
Sapir (2006) estimates that the EU and the US together account 80 % of global regulations and 
rules; if the two could harmonize, or make compatible, a majority of these, it would not only tie 
the two giants together but also ensure that most countries in the world would adopt the same 
standards in order to access the EU and US markets.5 Trade agreements can include agreed 
processes (e.g. food processing) or outcomes (e.g. led-free toys) in specific sectors, but how 
those are achieved by either signatory is normally a matter for respective party’s legal structure, 
even if some agreements include an agreed mechanism for ensuring conformity with the set 
standard. There are also different ways to remove differences between two systems and/or 
standards. Sector-specific equivalency (the recognition by both sides that two regulations are 
equivalent in practice) can lead to a Mutual Recognition Agreement (e.g. the 2008 EU-US MRA 
on Marine Equipment6); this in turn can promote further convergence, including a harmonization 
of conformity assessment (i.e. ensuring that assessments of adherence to standards are the 
same). 
Products and services on either side of the Atlantic are generally of equally high quality and 
safety standards, and the fastest growing part of trade across the Atlantic is intra-firm. Yet within 
the same sectors different, and decisively institutionalized, regulations and safety practices 
endure. Cultural and institutional factors make regulatory compatibility or mutual recognition 
very sensitive in several areas, e.g. pharmaceuticals, pesticides, audiovisual services, or 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS; i.e. food safety). Several EU members such as 
France, Italy, and Portugal, oppose significant changes to SPS measures and in unblocking 
certain closed professions (notaries, pharmacies, taxis). France secured a “cultural exception’” 
in the EU Commission’s June 2013 negotiating mandate, and reiterated its determination to veto 
any agreement liberalizing distribution of, or investments in, audiovisual services (which were 
excluded from KOREU and CETA).7 The 1920 Jones Act, banning foreign shipping between 
American ports, is considered a “sacred cow” by trade unions and Democrats in Congress – 
                                                          
5
 Felbermayr/ Heid/ Lehwald, fn.3, p. 28. 
6
 Mutual Recognition Agreement On Marine Equipment. 
United States Coast Guard, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg5214/mra.asp (1/2/1014). 
7
 Fox, EU-US Trade talks to start after France wins culture clause, EUObserver, 2013. 
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neither NAFTA nor KORUS altered this protectionist legislative tomb.8 The fragmented 
American market in services means EU insurance companies are obliged to seek business 
approval in all 50 American states, and the same applies to most other professional services. 
The federal government lacks legal authority to compel changes in state procurement policies, 
making increased access to sub-national public procurement, another pivotal EU goal, very 
difficult.  
In general, and across sectors, the KOREU, KORUS, and CETA all contain commitments to 
provide national treatments to all goods (similar or substitutable) from the other party, ensure 
that accreditation and recognition of conformity assessment bodies in the territory of the other 
party are done on the same terms used domestically, and adhere, at minimum, to the WTO’s 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT).9 There are general commitments on working 
together to remove additional regulatory barriers, increase transparency and mutual 
understanding of respective systems, facilitate access to each other’s markets, align regulations 
with international standards, and identify and promote standards and technical regulations that 
respect both sides’ national laws. Crucially, none of the agreements eliminate all tariffs. 
Furthermore, specific safeguards (temporarily restricting imports of, or ceasing tariff reductions 
on, a product) cannot extend beyond two years, nor exceed the lowest tariff of either a) that 
which is accorded a third party through existing MFN agreements on the same product; or b) the 
base rates stipulated in respective treaties’ annexes. In other words, safeguard measures 
cannot be used to reverse market liberalization. 
At the same time KORUS, KOREU, and CETA contain provisions stating that in areas not 
covered by the common (internal) European market the EU and its member states can 
“…maintain or adopt any measures pertaining to […insert service here],” and most member 
states also declare numerous reservations exempting a country or sector from a treaty’s 
provisions on granting market access to foreign companies and/or providing a foreign company 
equal treatment to that of a national. Such exemptions can apply across one or more of four 
modes: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and the presence of 
natural persons.10 Initial proposals reveal TTIP will be no different (e.g. Poland reserves the 
right to require incorporation of storage and warehouse service providers). 
                                                          
8
 The ‘Jones Act’ includes the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 App. U.S.C. § 883; the Passenger Vessel 
Act, 46 App. U.S.C. §§ 289, 292, and 316; and 46 U.S.C. § 12108. Annex 2-A of Free Trade Agreement 
Between the United States and the Republic of Korea of 30 June 2007 explicitly rejects MFN or national 
treatment on this issue. 
9
 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, World Trade Organization,  
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm (1/2/2013). 
10
 For exemptions in KOREU see Annexes 7-A-4 through 7 D.  
7 
 
Even the staunchest free-trade advocates recognize that not all differences can or should be 
eliminated, or even coordinated. Regulations often reflect genuinely different constituent 
preferences and strategies, and serve desired public and social objectives, e.g. on health or 
financial stability. Still, much regulatory difference between the US and the EU stem not from 
divergent public policy choices but rather from being devised independently, a lack of 
transatlantic coordination, and there are many areas with particularly strong potential for some 
form of coordination, mutual recognition, or harmonization. Compliance costs with American 
federal laws and EU level regulations are estimated at €50 and €96 bn annually.11 The prospect 
of some form of Transatlantic Regulatory Impact Assessment (TARIA) has been raised in 
negotiations, and one study found that a TARIA just on product safety regulations applied on 
both sides of the Atlantic would improve real American and European income by .05-.1%, while 
cutting compliance costs for business.12  
Efficiency and economic benefits notwithstanding, political, emotional, and ideological factors 
are always present when public policy reform is raised. Opposition from regulatory authorities 
and bureaucracies, who for political reasons (power) and self-interest (jobs and resource 
allocation) oppose change, means “where you sit is where you stand”. Similar factors apply to 
public opinion, where ideological convictions, fear, and lack of knowledge of the complexity of 
foreign affairs and trade intermingle to produce often irreconcilable demands (e,g. specific 
protectionism at home while opening markets abroad, or opposition to labor standards even 
when the other party’s standards are higher).13 Recent surveys found a majority of Americans 
viewing trade as an economic opportunity, while 35% see them as a threat to jobs; 76% of 
Americans and 75% of Europeans in early 2014 said they desire closer regulatory integration 
with the EU/US respectively.14 Yet dig a bit deeper and one finds that among Americans aged 
50 and above (the largest voting block), those lacking a college education, and among trade 
union members, support for TTIP is well below 50%; one also finds clear European misgiving 
about US standards on health and food, with over half of Germans opposed to harmonizing EU 
and US standards. The main benefits of modern trade and investment agreements are difficult 
                                                          
11
 Dudley/Warren, Regulators Budget Report, WCEGPP, 2012. 
12
 Morrall, Determining Compatible Regulatory Regimes between the U.S. and the EU, US Chamber of 
Commerce, 2011,p. 7, 32, 36. 
13
 See e.g. Transatlantic coalition rejects anti-consumer trade deal, Deutsche Welle, 13 June 2013, 
http://www.dw.de/transatlantic-coalition-rejects-anti-consumer-trade-deal/a-16874500 (2/2/2014);  
Freund, Encouraging a Manufacturing Renaissance through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, PIIE, 2 May, 2014. 
14
 Pew Global Attitudes Project, April, 2014,  
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/04/09/support-in-principle-for-u-s-eu-trade-pact (2/5/2014);  
German Marshall Fund 2007, www.gmf.org (1/2/2012). 
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to quantify and explain to a skeptical public, thus leaving policy makers facing communication 
problems as much as negotiators face technical hurdles. 
 
C. Select Issue Areas Being Negotiated 
 
I. Agriculture and Food 
 
Europeans express high trust in scientific research, yet food, and therefore food safety, is 
perceived as a large part of culture; its social value far exceeds its nutritional value, and thus 
culturally rooted relations with food lead to cognitive dissonance vis-à-vis scientific evidence.15 
Many Europeans reject scientific studies which find certain food processes safe if they have 
long been thought dangerous.16 The EU’s precautionary principle – the process of proving a 
negative, of not allowing anything unless scientifically proven not to be harmful – reflects this 
approach. Its guiding principles are supposed to be non-discriminatory, and the Commission 
must use scientific data to evaluate, and continuously re-assess, a product. This does not 
always occur. Despite inconclusive scientific studies on the safety of products such as meats 
treated with antimicrobial washes to reduce pathogens, hormone treated beef, and various 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) proposed for the EU market, and reports showing no 
immediate threat to humans, these remain on the EU’s list of “unacceptables” (for tariff and 
quota free entry into the EU).17 There are 50 GMOs approved for use in the EU, but the 
approval process is very long, political, and uncertain. A 2014 Commission proposal to amend 
the existing EU Directive would allow member states to decide which of the approved GMOs to 
allow domestically, but a country banning a particular GMO cannot prohibit imports of products 
from other EU states allowing the use of the same GMO.18 This may provide an opening for 
compromise in negotiations.  
                                                          
15
 Eurobarometer 63, 2005, p.51. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_en.htm (2/4/2011);  
cf. Kraus, PIIE, 2 May, 2014. 
16
 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2012,  http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western-
european-values-gap/ (2/3/2013). 
17
 See e.g. Explanatory Memorandum to accompany the EC Proposal for a Council Regulation 
implementing Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
the use of antimicrobial substances to remove surface contamination from poultry carcasses, 29/10/2008; 
Scientific Option of the Panel on Biological Hazards on a Request from DG SANCO on the assessment of 
the possible effect of the four antimicrobial treatment substances on the emergence of antimicrobial 
resistance,  EFSA Journal 2008, 659, p.1-26. 
18
 The amended directive would not impact the assessment process for GMOs conducted. 
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All Trade Promotion Authority bills introduced in the US Congress since 2011 have recognized 
countries’ rights under the WTO Agreement on the Application of SPS measures to allow certain 
restrictions based on health concerns, while insisting that all trading partners (read EU) must 
ensure “…science-based justification be provided for a sanitary or phytosanitary measure if the 
measure is more restrictive than the applicable international standard [and]…appropriately 
recognize the equivalence of health and safety protection systems of exporting countries” (read 
US).19 The WTO has ruled that the EU ban on hormone treated beef is not based on proper risk 
assessment, but noted that in the absence of accepted definitions of risk or common 
international standards for beef it was not strictly illegal or arbitrarily protectionist.20 
Notwithstanding the lack of a uniform definition of protectionism in the WTO, many argue that 
consumers should be alarmed when domestic industry supports regulations on itself that limit 
trade.21  
Concomitantly, due to NTBs American consumers can only buy apples and beef from two EU 
states, and pay nearly twice as much for European cheese as they would absent tariffs and 
quotas. The latter are to large extent retaliation for the significant tariffs and regulatory barriers, 
such as somatic cell count limits (milk quality indicators), costly mandates related to certificate 
dating, and bans on certain generic food names, faced by American dairy farmers exporting to 
Europe. Easier access to the US market is evidenced by EU dairy farmers’ exports, which 
amount to 12 times that of their American peers’ sales in the EU, thus American farmers hope 
trade negotiations can pry open EU markets.22  
KOREU allows agricultural safeguard measures (ASG), tariffs, and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on 
“sensitive” products (rice and dairy for Korea; beef, pork, dairy for the EU). It incorporates the 
WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (ASPS), and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
by the European Food Safety Agency under Directive 2001/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC - Commission Declaration OJL 106, 17/04/2001, 
and Regulation (EU) No. 1829/2003 the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003on genetically modified food and feed. OJL 268 8/10/2003. 
19
 H.R. 3830 Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014, introduced 19/1/2014, p. 6-7; cf. also 
H.R. 6538, To establish trade negotiating objectives with respect to the application of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures to agricultural products, and for other purposes, introduced 9/21/2012. 
20
 DISPUTE DS26 European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), World Trade Organization, Appellate Body ruling, November 2011, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds26sum_e.pdf (2/2/2013). 
21
 Watson/James, Regulatory Protectionism A Hidden Threat to Free Trade, Cato 723, 2013, p. 4. 
22
 Dairy Groups Welcome Launch of U.S.-EU Negotiations’ National Milk Manufacturing Federation, 30 
March, 2013, http://www.nmpf.org/latest-news/articles/dairy-groups-welcome-launch-us-eu-negotiations 
(1/6/2014). 
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establishes a committee to work, among other things, on enhancing mutual understandings of 
procedures and to oversee implementation of the agreement.  
KORUS also allows ASG and TRQs to protect Korean and American markets. It incorporates 
the WTO’s ASPS, and establishes a committee to work, among other things, on enhancing 
mutual understanding of procedures and oversee implementation of the agreement.  
CETA incorporates the WTO’s ASPS and establishes a committee to enhance mutual 
understanding of procedures and oversee implementation. There are no changes to the EU’s 
ban on imports of GMOs. Both sides vow to work on establishing equivalencies in each other’s 
inspection and certification systems. 
While all three agreements incorporate the WTO’s ASPS only CETA went beyond this – 
a recognition of the greater similarities between the EU and Canada on issues related to food. 
The US interprets ASPS as allowing practices not acceptable in the EU and Korea, which is a 
problem for TTIP. Most EU states as well as the EP are highly unlikely to approve imports of 
poultry, beef, and pork cleaned using prevailing American rules, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are opposed to liberalization, worried that the result will be a lowering of 
EU safety standards. KORUS, KOREU, and CET also exclude the most “contentious” 
agricultural products. If this applies to TTIP (as it was indicated by the initial texts in May 2014, 
where both said they were disappointed with the other’s offer) the resultant effects on global 
standards will be that certain agricultural products are always acceptable to exclude from 
complete tariff elimination based on reasons of “serious domestic interests.” Furthermore, given 
that several leading member of Congress have stated they will not approve a TTIP without 
significantly improved market access for American meat and poultry, this sector may prove an 
insurmountable obstacle. 
 
II. Investments  
 
While mutual onshore investments exceed $4trn (2013) – with billions of new investments 
added each year – European and American companies looking to invest in respective area still 
face numerous NTBs, including differentiated tax treatments, service sector restrictions, health 
or technical standards forcing duplication and redundancy in testing, and sector specific 
prohibitions on foreign ownership.23 Both have restrictions on foreign ownership in the energy, 
                                                          
23
 See e.g. Thomsen, FDI liberalisation in OECD and selected non-member countries: Trends and recent 
developments’ OECD, 2011. 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentfordevelopment/46485414.pdf (2/2/2013). 
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aerospace technology, air transport, and communications sectors. Various EU member states 
impose additional restrictive policies affecting foreign investors in a variety of fields (e.g. limits 
on film production and distribution in France, stocks with differentiated voting rights in Germany 
and Sweden, or liquor monopoly in Sweden). Several member states retain “national 
champions” in non-defense sectors (agriculture, aerospace, energy, or alcohol), which are 
effectively off-limits for take-overs; studies have identified numerous steps the EU can take to 
facilitate trade by focusing on improving airports, shipping ports, the speed of processing 
paperwork, and improving coordination across member states in for example services and 
online purchases.24 The review processes for examining large foreign acquisitions, mergers, 
and takeovers in the US (the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS) is 
lengthy, and costly. The fragmented American market in services means EU insurance 
companies are obliged to seek business approval in all 50 American states; the same applies to 
most other professional services.  
Both the EU Commission and the US insist on some form of ISDS system which ensures 
governments can fully legislate and regulate in the interest of its citizens and prevents frivolous 
suits, while protecting legitimate claims when governments renege on explicit commitments, 
adopt laws which clearly violate trade agreements, or the state expropriates company assets.25 
Europeans have longstanding experience with ISDS through Bilateral Investment Agreements 
(BITs). BITs began in Europe after WWII as investors wanted assurances when investing in 
former colonies, and EU member states have signed 1,400 BITs, compared with the mere 48 
signed by the US.26 EU regulations enable BITs to remain in force (transitionally) under new EU-
level bilateral agreements.27 EU investors use ISDS more than their US counterparts; in 2013 a 
third of cases filed globally were intra-EU.28 Yet the vast majority of challenges are launched 
                                                          
24
 Van der Marel, Trade and Logistics: A “Bali Package” for the EU, ECIPE Bulletin 1, 2014.  
25
 Oliver/Donnan, Brussels presses US on bank rules Bloc wants issue on trade pact agenda  Stiff 
resistance from across Atlantic Financial Times 2014, p. 2; ‘Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act, 
fn. 19. 
26
 A good history of ISDS is Lester, Liberalization or Litigation? Time to Rethink the International 
Investment Regime, Cato 730, 2013. 
27
 Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries.’ OJL 
351/40 of 20/12/2012. 
28
 Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD, No. 1, April, 2014, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf (2/5/2014); Donnan, France offers 
trade embrace even as European objections grow, Financial Times, 2014, p.3. The following are normally 
included in BITs. National treatment , MFN, Fair and equitable treatment full protection and security, 
Transfer of funds, compensation for expropriation, Performance requirement prohibition, Protection of 
government’s rights to regulate in the public interest, Transparency of laws and regulations, Labor and 
environmental provisions, Right of investor to sue host government, Protection against frivolous cases, 
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against developing nations’ governments, and UN data shows that even if including developed 
nations investors prevailed in only one third of all cases.29  
The transatlantic partners have tried to harmonize investment rules. A transatlantic agreement 
on Regulatory Principles for Trade and Investments in Information and Communication 
Technology Services with Third Countries was signed in 2011. A year later these principles 
were extended to all areas of investments in third countries, committing the EU and the US to 
urge countries with which they sign agreements to adhere to international standards of 
transparency, equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors, ensure investor capital 
protections, provide dispute resolutions, and guarantee overall responsible business conduct in 
conformity with OECD guidelines.30 Most of the same ideas are promoted for inclusion in the 
TTIP, and could help the millions of SMEs who create 75-85% of new jobs on both sides of the 
Atlantic, but often lack the economic resources, know-how, and information about potential 
partners and foreign markets to benefit from opportunities in the transatlantic market and 
beyond.  
Congress is unlikely to approve any deal without ISDS; every TPA bill presented in congress 
includes an ISDS. US negotiators also insist that “A comprehensive 21st century trade 
agreement should include appropriate protections for investors…and that does include ISDS. It 
is important that these provisions respect national regulatory space and that nothing we do on 
investor protection interferes with this.”31 The EU Commission notes “…that ISDS until now has 
led to some very worrying litigation against the state” but insists that an ISDS will both 
safeguard legitimate European public policy objectives and ensure that European investors are 
adequately protected from American treaty circumvention such as local favoritism, “padded 
contracts,” and “pork-barrel politics.”32 European consumer groups have awakened over ISDS in 
TTIP, fearful of American companies suing European governments over legislation the latter 
consider necessary, such as new environmental laws. On the American side a dominant 
argument against ISDS is that it provides additional judicial rights and avenues to foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Non-conformity measures, Arbitration (ISDS). Source: Donnelly, The Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism: An Examination of Benefits and Costs Conference, CATO, 2014. 
29
 UNCTAD, fn 28. 
30
 Statement of the European Union and the United States on Shared Principles for International 
Investment, April 2012, European Commission, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/april/tradoc_149331.pdf (2/3/2013). 
31
 US lead negotiator Mullaney in Fox ‘Germany opposes EU-US investor protection scheme’ 
EUObserver March 15, 2014. 
32
 EU Trade Commissioner de Gucht in Whittington, Implementing Canada-EU free-trade deal could take 
another two years, The Star, April 24. 
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entities beyond those available to American companies.33 To address said fears a suspension 
of negotiations on this section in order to elicit stakeholder feedback ensued January–June 
2014, yet, if anything, this appears to have intensified opposition.34  
Experienced advisers and free trade advocates remain divided on its merits. Ikenson (2014) 
argues that investments should always carry certain risks, and ISDS encourages discretionary 
investments while socializing private risks by having the public pay if the state is successfully 
sued. ISDS is thus unnecessary regulatory overkill by presuming that governments do not want 
FDI, will mistreat foreign investors, and that domestic courts are inadequate to cope with legal 
challenges.35 Erixon (2014) finds ISDS necessary, because having national courts settle 
investment disputes means governments must transpose the content of investment-protection 
into domestic law; most countries’ laws generally treat foreign entities differently than national 
ones, and states can change relevant laws and regulations to fit a political whim.36 Thies (2013) 
argues that the Court of Justice of the European Union shies away from interfering with other 
international institutions and trade organizations because of its concerns with political 
interference and the potential costs to the EU;37 not unlike the U.S. Supreme Court and its 
punting on “political questions”, that is, it prefers to leave those questions legislators and policy 
makers as often as possible. Though rarely discussed publicly, this could strengthen the case 
for an ISDS.  
KOREU covers cross-border provisions of services as well as the liberalization of investment 
regulations in most sectors short of defense. Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment applies to 
all covered investments, and it allows for 100% European ownership in Korean 
telecommunications and financial services, as well as for complete repatriation of data to 
national headquarters. There is an extensive ISDS with exclusions for certain sectors, APSA in 
particular, similar to KORUS.  
CETA appears favorable to the EU, as Canada agreed to quadruple the acquisition level under 
which European companies’ takeover bids are treated equivalent to domestic bids (from 
                                                          
33
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C$344m to C$1.5bn).38 There is an ISDS applicable to most areas, including SPS measures 
and financial services, where either side can adopt prudential measures, and allows private 
challenges against “…regulatory action which does not have a mutually recognised prudential 
character”.39 The EU Commission expressed contentment with the result, noting that ISDS will 
not apply to an investment made prior to establishment and that CETA may be a precursor for 
TTIP, “Given the challenge to reconcile the NAFTA approach with those of the various BIT 
models already existing in Member States, the outcome presents a well-balanced text, which 
will stand us in good stead for other negotiations”.40 Then again, the Commission has also noted 
that each case is different and that “TTIP was a special case”, which appears at odds with the 
goal of setting global standards; ISDS in TTIP ensures the same can be demanded of China in 
future investment agreements. Conversely, an EU/US failure would undermine joint efforts to 
ensure players like China abide by international law and adhere to western standards. 
 
III. Data Protection 
 
Data protection is a challenge for business, consumers, and regulators alike. Privacy laws differ, 
and Europeans (especially consumer groups and the EP) insist on stricter regulations than most 
American companies, and Congress, consider cost-effective. Notwithstanding the existing EU-
US Safe Harbor Agreement (where American companies abide by EU law on the storage and 
use of personal data), privacy concerns have shot up the ladder in Europe following revelations 
of NSA spying and American communication companies’ cooperation; partly in response the 
European Parliament adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in March 2014, 
sending it to the Council for likely approval in late 2014.41 Intended to simplify regulations 
through a “one stop shop” while simultaneously strengthening individual citizens’ privacy 
protection, the GDPR excludes small business from most of the requirements, which should be 
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good news for TTIP. Still, studies indicate that many companies find several of its provisions 
prohibitively expensive and largely unworkable.42  
In an attempt to stem European criticism of spying the US Attorney General offered a new Data 
Protection Privacy Agreement with the EU whereby “[…] E.U. citizens would have the same 
right to seek judicial redress for intentional or willful disclosures of protected information, and for 
refusal to grant access or to rectify any errors in that information, as would a U.S. citizen under 
the Privacy Act.”43 The US Congress must approve this agreement in order to amend US law, 
and EU Foreign Ministers and the Commissioner for Justice remained cautious: “Words only 
matter if put into law. We are waiting for the legislative step.”44 Adding to the legal uncertainty 
and privacy concerns are two ground breaking decisions by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. In April 2014 an EU Directive requiring private telephone companies to store 
customer data was invalidated.45 This directly conflicts with the American approach of requiring 
private companies to store private communications data. Two months later the court decided 
that individuals – under certain circumstances – have a right to “be forgotten” on the internet by 
having links to information removed; multinational internet providers and software companies 
must now figure out how best to comply, while lawmakers must find new ways to balance 
practical laws and regulations for business with public concerns about privacy of their data.46 
 
D. Conclusion and Prospects 
 
Divergent positions and ingrained preferences will make concluding TTIP difficult. Any 
agreement will face major opposition from consumer groups, trade unions, and specialty trade 
groups, all of whom rally voters, and thus indirectly and directly sway the views of legislators. 
The Democratic leadership in the US Congress supported KORUS in 2006, before turning 
against it in 2007; they heralded the launch of TTIP as very positive, before turning against TPA, 
the Transpacific Partnership, and elements of TTIP in 2014. Though Republicans are more pro-
trade, many far-right (“tea-party”) legislators exude isolationism on all fronts. The EP, armed 
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with its power to approve trade agreements along with the Council, has not shied from also, 
albeit informally, exerting influence on the negotiating mandate as well as ongoing 
negotiations.
47
 Though the EP is generally supportive of trade given its centrality in the 
evolution of the EU, both far-right and environmental parties oppose most aspects of TTIP, and 
such parties made significant strides in the May 2014 EP elections. Their impact is likely limited 
in the EP, but in domestic politics these parties may raise public concerns about TTIP loosening 
regulations in areas on which they ran successful campaigns: labor movement, food 
regulations, data protection, environmental relations, and thus move certain member state 
governments to adopt a tougher stance on TTIP. Prior to TTIP negotiations in 2012 America’s 
largest union (AFL/CIO) expressed cautious support for a deal, only to express serious 
concerns about TTIP and jobs in 2014. European trade unions and consumer groups express 
similar fears, and are organizing extensively on the full range of issues covered by TTIP.48  
As basic negotiation theory shows, if the range of participating parties’ minimally acceptable 
outcome fail to overlap there is no possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.49 In 
KORUS, KOREU, and CETA, both the EU and the US used their size and attractiveness to 
extract greater concessions from and reforms in the other signatory, moving them to accept 
EU/US positions, resulting in (a) longer transition periods with higher retained tariffs on imports 
during those transitions; (b) greater recognition of their own standards and greater access to the 
other’s markets; (c) exclusion of goods and services they wanted to protect (e,g, domestic 
shipping in the US and GMOs and audiovisuals in the EU). But all three agreements are all very 
similarly structured. TTIP, which is meant to match and exceed these agreements, could include 
mutual recognition and equivalency clauses (e.g. Canadian and US auto parts in CETA) which 
would allow Canada and Korea to accede relatively easily, thus quickly broadening TTIP’s 
global application to four parties and over 900 million people. However, as these (and many 
other agreements) show, complete harmonization of regulations and rules between governing 
entities occurs infrequently, and convergence is even rarer (the process of converging US and 
European accounting standards ran over a decade, with joint processes of revenue recognition 
coming after 12 years of talks).  
Officials on both sides of the Atlantic privately acknowledge that they neither expect, nor see the 
necessity of, total agreement in all areas. Instead they aspire to achieve as broad an agreement 
                                                          
47
 Van den Patte/ De Ville/ Orbie, The European Parliament’s New Role in Trade Policy: Turning power 
into impact, CEPS 89, 2014. 
48
 Multiple NGO representatives at a conference on ISDS in TTIP, I attended organized by TACD, 
Washington DC June 24, 2014. 
49
 Fisher/Ury/ Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 1991. 
17 
 
as possible, and to use this as a basis on which to subsequently pursue harmonization or 
convergence; a so-called “living agreement” which can be continuously modified. This idea 
faces serious American congressional opposition, with threats of “pulling the plug” if 
negotiations appear headed towards a watered-down agreement. Whether this is a strategy 
aimed at eliciting concessions remains to be seen. What is clear is that TTIP will require 
unprecedented mutual accommodation, where finding overlap in respective actor’s range of 
acceptable outcomes will prove more challenging than anything previously encountered. 
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